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Global liquidity, house prices and policy responses
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Abstract
The paper investigates the impact of global liquidity on house prices around the world using
a novel proxy measured by the funding availability to global banks in the main financial centers.
We find supporting evidence that global conditions from the financial centers are transmitted to
local banks through bank flows. Focusing on the repo markets in the US, Europe, and the UK,
over the period 2000-2014 and using a panel VAR, we find that liquidity shocks impact house
prices in both emerging and advanced economies. However, countries’ exposure to liquidity
shocks can be mitigated by monetary policy, and by various general and house market specific
macroprudential policies. We document strikingly different effectiveness of these policies in
advanced and emerging markets.
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“We are all Macroprudentialist now. In the wake of the crisis the concept has risen with
breathtaking speed from virtual obscurity to currency in the policymaking world” (Borio, 2011).
1 Introduction
In the last decade, house prices around the world have registered a sustained upward trend, increas-
ing in the advanced economies by around 60% from 2000 until the recent financial crisis (Figure
1, plot a). This pattern has been rather similar to that of cross-border bank flows, encouraged
by benign funding conditions in major financial systems (Figure 1, plot b). The increasing trend
in both house prices and bank flows inverted during the recent financial crisis, when key financial
markets experienced severe liquidity dry-ups and credit conditions worsened around the world.
The responses of monetary authorities to the subsequent economic downturn have unleashed un-
precedented amounts of liquidity and, in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), house
prices resumed their upward trend. As these cycles evolved, countries have responded by developing
policy frameworks, such as a variety of macroprudential policies to tackle potential vulnerabilities
to financial stability and economic growth (Figure 1, plot c). Advanced economies have tightened
their monetary policy in the run up to the GFC, while house prices and bank flows were increasing
sharply. With rates at low levels in the aftermath of the financial crisis, they have been using increas-
ingly macroprudential policy, corresponding to the second phase of house price growth. Emerging
markets, on the other hand, relied on macroprudential policy earlier on, prior to the financial crisis,
and resumed their implementation following the crisis, again when facing rising house prices and
bank flows (Shim, Bogdanova, Shek, and Subelyte, 2013). This paper investigates the effectiveness
of these policies to tackle and mitigate the exposure of housing markets around the world to global
liquidity, that is the liquidity that crosses the border and affects directly, or indirectly credit con-
ditions in the recipient economies. Following the increasing popularity of macroprudential policy,
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a nascent strand of the literature investigates its effectiveness on house prices, together with the
impact of bank credit and bank flows, providing mixed evidence. We contribute to this discussion
by focusing on countries’ exposure to global shocks instead of domestic credit conditions. Thus,
we ask first whether the global conditions impact house prices and secondly, whether countries
by using macroprudential policy to restrain the local banking sector and housing market are able
to effectively shield economies from global liquidity. To offer a comprehensive analysis of policy
responses, we consider the effectiveness of monetary policy and capital controls as well.
Countries have adopted different policies at different times. Indeed, monetary authorities may
respond to house price pressure by raising their short-term rates to make financing more costly
and thus control credit growth (Sa, Towbin, and Wieladek, 2011). To tackle the growth of bank
credit triggered by the funding channel, countries may adopt policies directly targeted at the local
banking sector, thereby increasing the cost of lending and banks’ resilience to financial stability
shocks. Importantly, these policy measures are effective on the local banks and subsidiaries of
foreign banks, leaving foreign banks’ branches and nonbanks unaffected, which could make certain
policies ineffective.1 To mitigate the effects of bank flows and domestic bank credit growth on
house prices, countries may decide to target the housing market directly, by increasing the cost or
limiting banks’ housing-related lending activity and/or by making it more expensive and difficult
for borrowers to access housing loans. In targeting foreign credit in particular, countries may
adopt controls on foreign-currency lending. Finally, countries, which are especially concerned with
foreign investors may rely on capital controls, especially those targeted at foreign investors in the
real estate sector. Figure 2 offers a graphical representation of these transmission channels and
1Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2017a) and Cizel, Frost, Houben, and Wierts (2016) find that nonbank credit
increases when macroprudential policy is implemented across a large sample of countries. Employing bank-level data
for the UK, Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) find that tightening capital requirements on regulated banks
(domestic and foreign subsidiaries) results in greater lending by unregulated banks (foreign branches).
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how macroprudential policy can intercept them.
We contribute to the literature by investigating the role of policy tools that countries may
adopt to tackle the exposure of their housing market to global shocks as opposed to domestic
credit conditions. A recent strand of literature has emerged, which analyses the effectiveness of
macroprudential policy to mitigate episodes of house price growth, with mixed evidence (Akinci and
Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Cerutti et al., 2017a; Vandenbussche, Vogel, and Detragiache, 2015; Zhang
and Zoli, 2016; Craig and Hua, 2011; Igan and Kang, 2011). Moreover, the evidence on the role
of macroprudential policy on domestic credit growth is also mixed, with few papers documenting
a significant effect (Cerutti et al., 2017a; Tovar, Garcia-Escribano, and Martin, 2012). However,
Beirne and Friedrich (2014) document that this effectiveness is weaker for countries with an open
banking sector, suggesting a key role for global conditions. But when targeted specifically towards
foreign credit, macroprudential policy can effectively reduce cross-border credit (Bruno, Shim, and
Shin, 2017; Ostry, Ghosh, Chamon, and Qureshi, 2012). Given the mixed evidence and some success
of macroprudential policy to mitigate cross-border bank flows, we study whether these policies are
effective in shielding countries’ housing markets from global shocks, either by reducing bank flows
and affecting the housing market directly, or else preventing foreign investments from reaching the
local market.
In order to capture the global liquidity dynamics relevant for house prices, we introduce a
new proxy for global liquidity, which focuses on the private component of liquidity of the major
wholesale funding markets for financial intermediaries, that is the repurchase agreement (repo)
market not only in the US, but also in the UK and Europe.2 The literature has concentrated on a
set of supply-side factors to measure global liquidity, such as bank leverage measures, the US TED
2Funding liquidity has been measured by repos in other works in different contexts e.g Banti and Phylaktis (2015);
Mancini Griffoli and Ranaldo (2011); Adrian, Etula, and Shin (2010); Coffey and Hrung (2009).
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spread, and the VIX (Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011; Shin, 2012; Cerutti, Claessens, and Ratnovski,
2014; Bruno and Shin, 2015). In line with this literature, we also consider supply factors, and
we focus on the changing conditions of the wholesale funding markets. Employing a panel vector
autoregression model (PVAR) over the period 2000-2014 on a group of advanced and emerging
economies, we document that global liquidity triggers house price movements around the world, in
line with previous findings (Darius and Radde, 2010; Tillmann, 2013; Cesa-Bianchi, Cespedes, and
Rebucci, 2015; Cesa-Bianchi, Ferrero, and Rebucci, 2018).
Although we find global liquidity to impact house prices, the question arises whether it is
sufficiently large to elude macroprudential policy measures and weaken the effectiveness of domestic
monetary policy. In this respect, we show that domestic governments can use monetary policy, in the
form of interest rate changes, to mitigate the impact of global liquidity on house prices in advanced
and emerging markets. Importantly, using an interactive PVAR we find that the adoption of
macroprudential policy frameworks reduces countries’ exposure to global shocks. This is especially
evident in advanced economies, especially for housing measures and a few banking policy measures
that shield countries from global shocks. In emerging markets, we find that banking and some
housing macroprudential policy measures mitigate but do not offset the effects of global shocks.
Nonetheless, we show that emerging markets can successfully rely on restrictions to non-resident
investments in the local real estate sector to shield their house prices from liquidity shocks. These
findings have policy implications for countries, which would like to limit their exposure to global
liquidity.
In the next section we review the related literature. In section 3, we describe the data and
provide some preliminary analysis. We present the empirical analysis of the impact of changes
in funding liquidity on house prices in section 4. Section 5 investigates the impact of domestic
monetary policy on house prices and compares its impact to that of global liquidity. Section
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6 investigates the role of macroprudential policy on the exposure of countries to global shocks.
Finally, section 7 concludes and reports some policy implications.
2 Literature Review
Our work draws from two strands of literature, the first relates to the impact of global liquidity on
house prices, while the second relates to the effectiveness of macroprudential policy to curb credit
and house price growth.3
Shin (2012) shows that permissive financing conditions are transmitted globally via cross-border
banking and global banks leverage. In their model of the international banking system, Bruno and
Shin (2015) contend that bank flows are affected by changes in the leverage of global banks. This
implies that financing conditions in the main financial systems are transmitted across borders to
the local banking sector. Departing from a US-based approach, Cerutti et al. (2014) show that
financing conditions originating in Europe, UK, and Japan in addition to the US are determinants
of cross-border bank debt. They consider global factors and include a measure of uncertainty
in the global financial markets, such as the VIX, and the US TED spread in addition to bank
leverage as measures of financing conditions. They also document a role for local country factors
on the extent to which global conditions affect cross-border bank flows. Finally, the importance of
funding considerations is documented in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011). Employing a difference-
in-difference approach, they study the shock transmission mechanism from banks in advanced to
banks in emerging countries. They find the main transmission mechanism to be the funding channel
to the banks in emerging countries as opposed to the cross-border direct lending or local lending
3The literature on house prices is vast. In this review we focus on the strand of the literature that studies house
price dynamics in the context of global liquidity, which is relevant for our work. See Agnello and Schuknecht (2009),
Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010) and Favilukis, Kohn, Ludvigson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) for more
general recent reviews on the determinants of house prices.
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by foreign banks’ subsidiaries. Investigating the effect on Peruvian banks of Russia’s 1998 default,
Schnabl (2012) document that foreign lending amplifies external shocks while foreign ownership
mitigates them. In the light of this literature, we focus on funding aggregate measures in the main
financial centers to capture the global liquidity conditions impact on cross-border bank flows.
Few studies have looked at the impact of global liquidity on the housing market. Focusing on
a panel of Asian countries, Tillmann (2013) find an overall positive effect of capital flows on house
prices, which is however different across countries. Empirical work on the relationship between
monetary liquidity and house prices provide mixed evidence. While Darius and Radde (2010) and
Belke, Orth, and Setzer (2010) document for the G7 and the OECD countries respectively a positive
impact of liquidity on house prices, only a limited effect is found in Brana, Djigbenou, and Prat
(2012) for a group of emerging markets.
Using a broader sample of countries, which includes both advanced and emerging economies,
and focusing on funding costs, such as the US TED spread, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) investigate
the effect of global liquidity on the macroeconomy and the housing market. Applying a PVAR
framework for the period 1990-2012, they document a stronger impact of cross-border bank flows
on house prices in emerging compared to advanced markets. To identify the effect of global liquidity,
they employ a US-based set of instruments related to global factors, including the TED spread and
VIX. Focusing on shocks to US dealers’ leverage, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2018) also employ a PVAR
framework and find a persistent effect of international credit supply shocks on house prices in a
group of advanced and emerging countries. Similarly to the above works, we investigate the reaction
of house prices to liquidity in a PVAR setting of 40 countries, which includes both advanced and
emerging economies, but extend the work in several dimensions as explained earlier.
The literature on macroprudential policy impact on house prices is relatively recent. Following
an increase in its implementation, researchers have started to look into its effectiveness. The findings
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are mixed.
First of all, it is important to note that advanced and emerging markets use the measures differ-
ently. Banking macroprudential policy is used to target credit growth in emerging markets, whereas
housing macroprudential policy is used to target house prices directly in advanced economies (Ak-
inci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018).
A number of papers have studied the effectiveness of banking macroprudential measures to curb
house price growth with mixed findings. In particular, the literature provides evidence of successful
implementation of limits to interbank exposure (Cerutti et al., 2017a; Vandenbussche et al., 2015)
and taxation on financial institutions activities for both developed and emerging markets (Cerutti
et al., 2017a). In emerging markets, foreign currency reserve requirements and capital buffers are
found to be significant in controlling house prices in emerging Europe (Vandenbussche et al., 2015),
and foreign currency reserve requirements and limits to foreign currency loans in Asia (Zhang and
Zoli, 2016). Conversely, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) find no significant role of either
capital buffers or reserve requirements.
Similar mixed evidence arises from the studies focusing on housing macroprudential policy.
While extensively used, there is limited evidence on the effectiveness of limits to loan-to-value
(LTV). This measure is found to be effective on house prices in Asia, but not in other regions
(Zhang and Zoli, 2016; Cerutti et al., 2017a; Craig and Hua, 2011; Igan and Kang, 2011; Cerutti,
Correa, Fiorentino, and Segalla, 2017b; Kuttner and Shim, 2016). To account for differences across
countries, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) find that its effectiveness depends directly on the
relative importance of banks in the financial system. Looking at other tools, Zhang and Zoli (2016)
find that housing taxes reduce house prices in Asia, whereas Kuttner and Shim (2016) show that
taxes actually increase house prices across various specifications and methodologies. Akinci and
Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) find that other measures, such as debt-service-to-income limits, capital
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buffer for housing loans, and limits to banks’ exposure to housing, affect house prices in a broad
set of countries, whereas Vandenbussche et al. (2015) document that they are not significant in
Central and Eastern European countries.
A related strand of the literature looks at the impact of macroprudential policy on bank credit
and bank flows. While not looking specifically at house prices, these studies are relevant because
they investigate a channel through which global liquidity affects house prices, as documented in the
review of the first strand of the literature above. Hence, we review this nascent literature briefly
as well.
In general, macroprudential policy reduces bank credit, more so in emerging markets (Cerutti
et al., 2017a; Tovar et al., 2012) and relatively closed economies (Cerutti et al., 2017a), but increases
non-bank credit (Cizel et al., 2016), foreign branches credit (Aiyar et al., 2014; Reinhardt and
Sowerbutts, 2015), and cross-border bank credit in open economies, especially with flexible currency
regimes (Cerutti et al., 2017a). Similarly, the effectiveness of macroprudential policy on bank credit
is reduced by more open banking sectors (Beirne and Friedrich, 2014).
Looking at specific measures, those unrelated to housing are relatively ineffective to curb bank
credit growth (Zhang and Zoli, 2016; Forbes, Fratzscher, and Straub, 2013; Ostry et al., 2012),
whereas housing-specific measures are generally effective (Zhang and Zoli, 2016; Bruno et al., 2017;
Lim, Columba, Costa, Kongsamut, Otani, Saiyid, Wezel, and Wu, 2011; Cerutti et al., 2017a; Ak-
inci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Kuttner and Shim, 2016). Furthermore, measures specifically
oriented towards foreign currency loans or foreign residents successfully reduce bank flow to emerg-
ing markets (Beirne and Friedrich, 2014; Bruno et al., 2017; Ostry et al., 2012). In Asia, Bruno
et al. (2017) find that these specific measures reduce the impact of VIX on bank flows. Focusing on
Romania, Epure, Mihai, Minoiu, and Peydro (2018) document a similar dampening effect of these
measures on the exposure of household credit to the VIX and foreign monetary policy.
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We contribute to the above discussion on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy measures
by investigating their effectiveness when countries are exposed to global shocks as opposed to
domestic credit conditions.
3 Data
3.1 Measuring global liquidity with repurchase agreements
Global liquidity is generally defined as the easing of financing conditions across borders (BIS, 2013).
In line with the literature, we abstract from the demand-side considerations of credit creation,
and we focus on shifts in the supply of financing at global level measured by the availability of
collateralized funding to financial institutions in the main financial systems. Looking at wholesale
funding markets, we measure global liquidity as the amount outstanding of repos in the US, UK,
and Europe.
This measure is related to other global liquidity proxies previously employed in the literature.
Looking at their behaviour in Figure 3, we can see that our measure of funding liquidity exhibits
a similar trend to the bank leverage measure proposed by Bruno and Shin (2015) and employed to
investigate the effects of credit supply on house prices, among other variables, in Cesa-Bianchi et al.
(2018). Looking at the repo market, our proxy is specific to the availability of collateralized funding
for investments to the key players in the markets. Although our proxy is an important source
of wholesale funding for banks (International Monetary Fund, 2015), other important financial
institutions, such as hedge funds and real estate investment trusts, rely on repos to finance their
operations (Baklanova, Copeland, and Mccaughrin, 2015). The focus of our analysis, however is on
the banking channel and we provide supporting evidence, which shows that global liquidity impacts
bank flows.
Other two widely used measures of global liquidity are the VIX and the TED spread (Cerutti
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et al., 2014; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015). The VIX is a measure of implied volatility in S&P500
options that captures risk aversion in global markets and thus the willingness of banks to extend
credit across borders. The TED spread is a measure of funding costs and is calculated as the
difference between three-month interbank interest rates and government yields, again generally
measured in the US. Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015) use these measures as part of a set of instruments
to investigate the impact of global liquidity on the macroeconomy and house prices. As Figure
3 shows, the VIX increases sharply as our proxy for funding availability declines not only during
the crisis, but also in the aftermaths during episodes of market uncertainty. Looking at funding
costs, the TED spread has been extraordinarily high during the recent financial crisis, making the
variable more a proxy for the crisis episode than a measure of funding liquidity over time. In this
respect, we consider the pattern of funding aggregates to capture more closely the evolution of
funding availability through time. Also, while the TED spread relates to unsecured markets, our
measure incorporates developments in market conditions, given the presence of collateral in repo
contracts. Nevertheless to test the robustness of our analysis, we also employ banks’ leverage, the
VIX and the TED spread as alternative measures for global liquidity in section 4.1.
Data on repos is available from Central Banks’ websites in domestic currency and converted in
USD with the IFS monthly exchange rates. The US data is the bilateral repos reported weekly by
primary dealers to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 4 Data on the repo positions of monetary
and financial institutions in the UK is reported monthly by the Bank of England. Monthly data
on repos of credit institutions in the Euro Area is available from the European Central Bank. The
4It is important to note that there is no comprehensive collection of data on repo contracts. As such, the data
we rely on does not capture the amount outstanding of contracts in the repo markets as a whole, but those reported
by US primary dealers. Given that these are primary dealers, we consider developments in their operations to be
representative of other market participants, while acknowledging the data limitation.
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sample period starts in January 2000, up until the end of 2014.5
Table 1 (Panel a) reports the descriptive statistics of the repo data. The US repo market is the
largest, with an average amount outstanding of nearly $2tn, followed by the European repo market
with $673bn. The amount outstanding in the UK market is around $123bn. The repo markets
in these countries exhibit very strong comovement, with correlation coefficients between amounts
outstanding of over 70%.
3.2 House price data
To measure house prices, we employ the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) dataset of res-
idential house. Our sample includes both advanced and emerging markets.6 Advanced countries
include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The emerging market subsample consists of
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. We supplement the BIS dataset
with the FRED residential house price indexes7 and other sources when longer time series are avail-
able. We report the details of sources and data sample availability in Table 1A in the Appendix.
All series are converted to 2010 base year, adjusted for seasonality, and deflated with the CPI. The
sample period starts in January 2000, up until the end of 2014.
Table 1 (Panel b) reports descriptive statistics of changes in house prices. The average quarterly
change in house prices for the period is around 0.7%, with larger changes in advanced economies
at 0.8% on average than emerging markets at 0.5% on average. Overall, house prices exhibit great
variation in both advanced and emerging markets, with standard deviations of 2.1% and 3.4%,
5The sample period is determined by the availability of macroprudential policy indicators.
6Classification of countries according to the World Economic Outlook of the IMF, 2000.
7The authors acknowledge use of the dataset described in Mack and Martinez-Garcia (2011).
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respectively.
3.3 Macroprudential policy
In order to investigate the effectiveness of countries’ responses to global shocks and house price
dynamics, we rely mainly on the publicly available database of prudential instruments developed
by Cerutti et al. (2017b). Prudential policy tools are non-monetary measures targeted at financial
stability that can be directed at individual institutions or are system wide. Macroprudential policy
comprises measures adopted to limit the risks to financial stability arising at systemic level. These
include requirements on capital, provisioning, liquidity, and loan eligibility (Galati and Moessner,
2013). Data on macroprudential measures is available for all countries in our sample at quarterly
frequency from 2000 to 2014. In addition to its comprehensiveness in terms of countries and time
period, we rely on this database because its accuracy and completeness have been reviewed by staff
from Central Banks participating in the International Banking Research Network and the IMF.
We supplement the database with data from Kuttner and Shim (2016) and Cerutti et al. (2017a),
where necessary. We give details on sources and construction of the indicators in Table 2A in the
Appendix. We divide the macroprudential policy measures into those targeting the banking sector,
those targeting foreign investors, and those targeting the housing market directly.
Macroprudential banking policy
Banking policy measures are those macroprudential instruments that target the banking sector
directly. Among these, we focus on liability side measures, such as reserve requirements.8 Reserve
requirements are the fraction of account deposits in local currency to be held as deposit with the
Central Bank or cash. Moreover, we look at capital and provisioning requirements, such as capital
8Although included in macroprudential databases by Kuttner and Shim (2016) and Cerutti et al. (2017b), reserve
requirements are also part of monetary policy (Borio and Shim, 2007; Crowe, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Rabanal, 2011;
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018).
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buffers, limits to bank concentration, limits to interbank exposure, and bank leverage ratios. Capital
buffers are requirements for banks to hold capital in proportion to their risk-adjusted total assets, as
determined by the Basel Accord.9 Limits to interbank exposure and bank concentrations are defined
by the Basel Committee at or above 10% of eligible bank capital towards a counterparty. The bank
leverage ratio is a fixed minimum leverage ratio. Finally, we consider taxation on activities that
are taxes and levy on revenues of financial institutions. We aggregate all series related to banking
in a country and form the banking policy index for the country.
Macroprudential foreign currency policy
Some macroprudential policy tools are directly targeting foreign investors (Bruno et al., 2017). As
opposed to capital controls, these measures are generally perceived to be more market-friendly and
they have been employed extensively since the East Asian financial crisis of the 1997-8 (Ghosh and
Qureshi, 2016). We consider foreign currency reserve requirements, i.e., reserve requirements on
foreign currency-denominated accounts, and limits to foreign currency loans.
Macroprudential housing policy
Some macroprudential measures adopted are directly targeted at the housing market. The goal to
restrict or slow the growth of housing market can be pursued with policies targeting the demand or
the supply for housing credit. Targeting the demand for housing credit, borrower-oriented measures
limit household leverage specific to housing loans irrespective of the type of lender. They include
caps to LTV, caps to debt service to income (DSTI), and housing-related taxes. Caps on LTV
are limits to the maximum amount a borrower can borrow against the real estate collateral. Caps
on DSTI are limit to the monthly payments on housing loans over income. Housing related taxes
9As evidence of blurred boundaries between policy tools, capital buffers may consider also as microprudential
policy (Cerutti et al., 2017b).
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are taxes on capital gains, wealth, subsidies for first time buyers, stamp duty, and tax-deductible
mortgage payments. From the supply side, housing credit supply measures are directed at lenders,
specifically domestic banks and comprise capital buffers for housing loans, limits to banks’ exposure
to housing, and loan loss provision (LLP) for housing loans. Capital buffers for housing loans are a
subset of the indicator for bank capital requirements that are specific to housing loans. Limits to
banks’ exposure to housing are limits to the supply of housing loans and generally expressed as a %
of equity, whereas LLP for housing loans are provisions for impaired housing loans. We aggregate
all series related to housing in a country and form the housing policy index for the country.
We take indicators of quarterly changes for all instruments. We then follow the literature
and cumulate the series since the first quarter of 2000 to capture the macroprudential stance in
our sample period with respect to each instrument (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). The
cumulated indexes for banking (including foreign currency measures) and housing policy are shown
in Figure 1, Plot c. The group measures for the advanced and emerging markets are obtained by
averaging the indexes for the countries in each of the group. It is important to note that these
cumulated indexes capture the paths of policy implementation relative to the 2000 level. Hence,
caution must be used, because countries may have started in 2000 at different levels (Cerutti et al.,
2017b). Noting this limitation of the database, the plots show that there has been a general upward
trend in the use of macroprudential policy. Looking at banking macroprudential policy, advanced
economies have adopted this policy after the recent financial crisis. In contrast, emerging markets
have relied on this policy since the early 2000s, with a temporary sharp retraction during the
financial crisis. Capital buffer accounts for most banking policy actions in advanced economies,
whereas local currency (LC) and foreign currency reserve requirements account for the majority of
policy actions in emerging markets (Table 2).10
10For comparability, in Table 2 we turned the series of number of policy actions into indicators of 1 for tightening,
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Turning to housing policy, emerging markets have increasingly adopted this policy, with a
retraction during the financial crisis. In contrast to banking policy, advanced economies have
relied on housing policy also in the period leading to the financial crisis. Caps to LTV have been
employed extensively both in advanced and emerging markets, followed by house taxation, and
housing-specific capital buffers for emerging markets (Table 2).
Table 2 show that advanced economies mostly relied on housing measures, with 115 policy ac-
tions from 2000 to 2014, versus 52 banking policy actions. Emerging markets have used extensively
all policy tools, especially banking measures with 286 policy actions in our sample period, followed
by 140 policy actions in housing policy and 106 actions in foreign currency measures.
Comparing the individual policy measures adopted by the countries, the average correlation of
banking policy measures is low at -1%.11 However, it is important to note that correlation coeffi-
cients between policy pairs vary widely, from 29% between capital buffers and limits to interbank
exposures, to -29% between limits to interbank exposures and concentration exposures. Turning
to housing policy measures, the average correlation is 20%. In this case, almost all correlation
coefficients are positive, with correlation coefficients as high as 68% for caps to LTV and caps to
DSTI, and as low as 3% and -26% for capital buffers for housing loans versus caps to DSTI and
housing taxes, respectively. Hence, while some measures are likely to be adopted together, that is
not always the case.
3.4 Other policy measures - monetary policy and capital controls
Countries may use monetary policy and controls on capital account convertibility to reduce vul-
nerability to global shocks.
-1 for loosening and 0 for no changes in the policy in the quarter. Then the number of actions is calculated as the
sum of the absolute value of the indicators, and summed within country groups.
11This value is calculated as the average of the correlation coefficients between pairs of policy measures cumulated
for each country at December 2014.
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In order to measure monetary policy outcomes, we employ short-term interest rates. Money
market rates are available for most countries from the IFS (IMF). For those countries with no
information on money market rates, we employed other proxies for short-term rates.12
With respect to capital controls, we consider controls to real estate investments by foreign
residents that take the form of required authorization, approval, permission, clearance, and ceiling
limits, as indicated in AREAER reports of the IMF. We employ the indicator from Ferna´ndez,
Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015). Moreover, we consider general controls on capital
account convertibility, the KAOPEN index by Ito and Chinn (2006). We report details on the
construction of these measures in Table 2A in the Appendix.
4 Do funding liquidity conditions affect house prices?
Our implied model of the channels of how global liquidity affects house prices is shown graphically
in Figure 2. In essence the local and foreign owned local banks in the domestic countries reach to
the global banks in the various financial centers for funding resulting in cross-border bank flows,
which enable the banks to lend to the domestic market and part of this credit will find its way
to the housing market. Thus, liquidity conditions of the global banks, which is captured in our
framework by the amount of repos will be transmitted to the housing market through cross border
bank flows. There are also the institutional investors, such as REITs, who might tap the repo
market directly, as well as the foreign real estate investors who might be investing in the housing
market contributing to the rise in house prices. As it can be seen, the various channels can be
intercepted by macroprudential policies. Our first task is to investigate whether shocks in funding
conditions in the major financial centers have an impact on bank flows and house prices.
12In particular, discount rates from the IFS (IMF) are used for Chile, China, and India, and deposit rates from the
IFS (IMF) are used for Croatia. For Norway, we used the short-term interest rates from the OECD. For Taiwan, we
use short-term rates from the Central Bank.
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For that purpose we estimate a PVAR model of funding liquidity and house prices, including
global variables such as global output as a proxy of global demand for liquidity, and domestic
variables such as bank flows, real GDP growth, and short term interest rates as proxies for local
demand factors for housing, as follows:
Xsi,q =
N∑
n=1
βiX
s
i,q−n + i,q s = [AGGR,US,UK,EU ], (1)
where Xsi,q = [Liq
s
q ,WorldGDPq, banki,q, GDPi,q, sri,q, P ricei,q], Liq is the funding liquidity con-
ditions in financial system s, WorldGDP is the world real GDP growth, bank is the bank flows
measured in country i, GDP is real GDP growth in country i, sr is the short term interest rate
in country i, and Price are house prices in country i. All variables except for GDP growth, bank
flows and interest rates are in logs.13 We determine the number of lags n with the Schwarz criterion
and it ranges between 1 to 2 lags.14
We focus on the impact of one standard deviation shock on funding liquidity in each of the
main financial centers on the local house prices of countries in advanced and emerging markets.
To avoid imposing restrictions on the slope coefficients of house prices across various countries,
we employ the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995). In essence, this is a dynamic
panel estimation approach that allows for full country heterogeneity. We estimate a VAR for each
country individually via OLS and estimate the impulse response functions (IRFs) by employing the
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals. Since we consider funding
conditions in the main financial systems to be exogenous to domestic conditions and local house
prices, we order our funding variables first. Moreover, we put house prices last in the order to allow
for bank flows, short-term interest rates, and GDP growth to impact house prices. To exclude
13Description and sources of the data are given in Table 1A in the Appendix.
14We allow a maximum of 2 lags to account for the relatively short time period of data for some countries in our
sample.
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that our results are driven by this ordering, we also compute the IRFs with alternative orderings.
We confirm that placing our funding liquidity variable last in the order, or just before house
prices, does not alter the results. In unreported results, we also find weak correlation coefficients
between VAR innovations, leading us to confirm that the contemporaneous correlation among
shocks in the system is negligible.15 We measure the average effect of the shock across countries by
averaging cross-country responses at each forecasting horizon, excluding the top and bottom 1%.
The standard errors of such measures are calculated as the cross-country variance of the responses
at each forecasting horizon, divided by the number of countries minus one (Pesaran and Smith,
1995).
We report the IRFs of house prices to shocks to funding liquidity originating in the US, EU, and
UK in Figure 4 for advanced economies (Panel a) and emerging markets (Panel b). Overall we find
that liquidity shocks affect both advanced and emerging markets. In advanced economies, house
price responses increase to 0.4% on average and they are short-lived, turning insignificant within
one year. The responses are stronger and more persistent in emerging markets, where they increase
to 0.6% after one year and turn insignificant after over two years. We find similar responses to
shocks originating in the US alone. This is in line with the results of Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2015),
who employ a US based set of instruments and document a stronger and longer lasting impact
of global liquidity shocks on house prices in emerging markets than advanced economies. Finally,
house prices also respond to shocks originating in the EU and UK, although the impact in advanced
economies peaks at only 0.2%, around half the peak response to US shocks. House price responses
in emerging markets are overall comparable irrespective of the origins of the shock. This brings out
the importance of considering the impact of global liquidity originating in financial centers other
than the US.
15Results are unreported for brevity, but they are available from the authors upon request.
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Turning to bank flows, we find that global liquidity shocks affect bank flows in advanced and
emerging markets (Figure 4, Panels a and b, respectively). When liquidity increases unexpectedly,
bank flows increase in all countries, signalling the important role that banks play in the transmission
of global shocks to the real economy. We document that bank flows are quick to respond to global
liquidity shocks and the impact is short-lived, with responses that last up to one quarter in advanced
economies and two quarters in emerging markets. Then, this relatively quick effect gets channelled
across borders and, as credit enters the local banking sector, it triggers longer lasting effects in
domestic housing markets.
4.1 Robustness tests
We perform two robustness exercises in order to test the validity of the VAR model by using other
proxies employed in the literature and by investigating the stability of our results to the crisis
period.
4.1.1 Alternative sources of global liquidity shocks
In addition to measuring global liquidity as funding availability to financial intermediaries in the
main financial centers, we turn to other factors that may capture global liquidity. First, we consider
the leverage of broker dealers in the US as a proxy for financing conditions of global banks. Second,
we employ the VIX to proxy for the global conditions that may affect banks’ willingness to extend
funding across border. Finally, we consider the cost of funding for financial intermediaries in the
US and employ the TED spread.
We report the results in Figure 5. Overall, we confirm that global liquidity shocks affect house
prices employing these alternative liquidity proxies. House price responses to US banks’ leverage
shocks are comparable in shape and persistence to the IRFs to aggregate funding liquidity shocks
documented above, but the responses are lower in magnitude for advanced economies, with peak
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at 0.25%. The VIX and TED spreads have longer lasting impact on house prices in advanced
economies, with responses turning insignificant after over one year. Looking at emerging markets,
the responses to shocks to US banks’ leverage and the VIX are comparable, while they are weaker
for shocks to TED spreads.
4.1.2 The global financial crisis
In the period leading up to the global financial crisis, countries experienced large bank flows coupled
with increasing house prices. In this section, we look at the impact of global conditions on house
prices during this period and estimate the VAR model in equation (1) up to 2008. In Figure 6 we
document the pre-crisis responses, which are stronger and more persistent for both advanced and
emerging markets, as compared to the IRFs for the whole sample period. In advanced economies
(Panel a) house prices increase to 0.8% after three years on average, whereas in emerging markets
(Panel b) house prices increase to 0.9% in the first year after the liquidity shock. The impact is
persistent and turns insignificant only after around five years. These findings are consistent with
the key role that banks played in the dynamics of global liquidity in the period leading up to the
crisis. Indeed, they highlight the consequences of this role for the exposure of housing markets
around the world to global liquidity.
We do not estimate the PVAR for the periods during and post crisis due to the relatively
short time period resulting in a low number of observations. Nonetheless, we check the structural
stability of our VAR estimations employing the maximal OLS cumulative sum (CUSUM) test for
coefficient stability. The test cannot reject the null of coefficient stability for 78% of the equations
in the VAR. Hence, we document that our findings are robust across our sample period.
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5 Impact of domestic monetary policy on house prices
Countries can adopt monetary policy to offset the impact of global shocks on the domestic housing
market.16 Looking at the impact of one standard deviation shock of the domestic short-term interest
rates on local house prices in Figure 7, we document a negative reaction of house prices in both
advanced and emerging markets to a contractionary domestic monetary policy. The responses are
not immediate, and house prices decline in both advanced and emerging markets by around -0.4%
and -0.3% respectively after one year from the one standard deviation shock in monetary policy.
Similarly to liquidity shocks, the responses are relatively more short lived in advanced economies,
where they turn insignificant after two years. Although the average responses to global liquidity
shocks and monetary policy are comparable in advanced economies, in emerging markets house
prices respond less to monetary policy shocks than global liquidity shocks (-0.4% and -0.3% versus
0.6%). This suggests that monetary policy may not be fully effective to counter global liquidity
shocks in emerging markets as opposed to advanced economies.
5.1 Forecast error variance decomposition
We now perform forecast error variance decomposition to assess the relative role of global liquidity
versus domestic monetary policy on house price developments. In particular, we compute the
contribution of shocks to global liquidity and domestic short-term rates to the forecast error variance
of house prices for VAR models estimated for each country in the sample as reported in equation
(1). We employ recursive re-formulation of the VAR model and use the Cholesky decomposition to
achieve orthogonal structural shocks.
Although we have found global liquidity to impact house prices, the question arises whether
it is sufficiently large to weaken the effectiveness of domestic policy in the presence of increased
16For a detailed analysis of the impact of monetary policy on house prices see Sa et al. (2011).
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global liquidity. An unanticipated increase in short term domestic interest rates constitutes a
contractionary monetary policy, which has been found as expected to have a dampening effect on
house prices. On the other hand an increase in global liquidity has a positive impact on house
prices.
Table 3 shows the percentage of the total forecast error variance of house prices at horizons
of n={1,4,8,12,16,20} quarters that can be ascribed to global funding and to domestic interest
rate shocks. The variance decomposition reveals a different pattern for advanced and emerging
markets. For the advanced economies 17% of the forecast error variance 20 quarters ahead can
be ascribed to global liquidity shocks and 15% to domestic monetary policy shocks. That implies
that monetary policy is potentially quite effective in advanced markets in moderating the impact
on house prices arising from global liquidity. This finding is in line with the results of Darius and
Radde (2010), who using a monetary aggregate definition of global liquidity find that liquidity lost
predictive power of asset prices completely, including house prices in the G7 countries during the
2000s. Their explanation is that this is due to the expansionary monetary policies, which played a
much greater role than global factors in house price developments.
Looking now at emerging markets 21% of the forecast error variance 20 quarters ahead can be
ascribed to global liquidity shocks and 17% to domestic monetary policy shocks. Similarly for the
emerging markets as well domestic monetary policy is effective and might mitigate the impact of
global liquidity shocks on house prices.
6 Can macroprudential policy mitigate the impact of global liquidity on house
prices?
Having established that domestic monetary policy is effective in both groups of countries in mit-
igating the countries’ exposure to liquidity shocks, we now turn our attention to macroprudential
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policies, that have been increasingly used by all countries, to examine their effectiveness in moder-
ating the impact of global liquidity on house prices.
Following Towbin and Weber (2013) and Sa et al. (2011), who study the effect of certain country
characteristics on countries’ exposure to external shocks, we use macroprudential policy variables
as indicators and condition the global liquidity shocks on house prices to the intensity of the
macroprudential policy stance adopted by countries. To do so, we interact global liquidity with the
macroprudential policy indicators in the VAR models in equation (1). The interacted term allows
us to exploit the time and cross-section variation of the macroprudential policy indicators and
compute the IRFs of global liquidity shocks on house prices as outlined in Section 4, conditional on
the macroprudential policy stance.17 We set the threshold levels for tight and loose macroprudential
policy stances at 75% and 25%, respectively, and we compute the average IRFs for countries in
each group. By examining the differences between the IRFs for tight and loose macroprudential
policy states across countries and time, we can determine whether the policy measures are potential
drivers of the exposure of the housing markets to global liquidity. We conduct this exercise for each
policy measure.
Countries may also reduce their exposure to global shocks by imposing controls on their capital
account. Thus, we investigate the role of a specific capital control policy targeted at foreign
investors and relevant to the housing market, such as controls on real estate investments by foreign
residents. In addition, we consider the effectiveness of general capital controls. We follow the same
procedure described above to calculate the impact of liquidity shocks on house prices for countries
with stronger and weaker capital controls.
Figures 8 - 10 report the IRFs of house prices to liquidity shocks for loose macroprudential
policy stances in the top row, tight macroprudential policy in the middle row, and their mean
17We do not censorize the responses to calculate the average IRFs due to limited cross sections.
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difference in the bottom row, for the each type of macroprudential policy. The effectiveness of the
policy measures is also summarized in Table 4. We assess each type of policy below, starting with
the macroprudential banking policy indicators:
Banking policy (Figure 8): For advanced economies in Panel a, we find capital requirements
and leverage ratios to shield countries from global liquidity shocks, with positive responses of house
prices that last beyond five years in the case of loose capital requirements and leverage ratios, and
mostly insignificant responses for tight policies. The mean differences of the responses are significant
as well in the short-term. LC reserve requirements do not have a significant effect on global liquidity
shocks, since responses for loose and tight requirements are not significantly different from each
other. This also applies to other banking-related measures, such as limits to bank concentration
and limits to interbank exposure. Finally, taxes on bank activities are only rarely used in advanced
economies.
Turning to emerging markets in Panel b, we find that capital requirements, limits to bank
concentration, limits to interbank exposure, and taxes on bank activities reduce the impact of
global liquidity shocks on house prices, but do not shield countries from them. Indeed, IRFs are
generally positive and persistent irrespective of the policy stance, but the mean differences between
loose and tight policies are generally positive and significant, with 1 or 2 percentage points of
difference in the peak house price responses. The evidence on LC reserve requirements is not
conclusive, with no significant responses for either loose or tight policies and with differences that
are negative at first and turn positive later on.
These findings are indicative of the important role that the domestic banking sector plays
in the transmission of global shocks to housing markets (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015), especially
in emerging markets. As global financing conditions improve, bank flows may lead to greater
availability of resources for domestic banks. The subsequent availability of domestic credit leads to
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house price increases. However, the imposition of macroprudential measures increases the cost and
limits banks’ operations thus reducing the extent to which easing global conditions are reflected
in growing domestic credit conditions (see Figure 2 for a graphical scheme of this barrier to the
transmission of global shocks to local housing markets).
Housing policy (Figure 9): In advanced economies in Panel a, housing-specific measures appear
most effective to shield domestic housing markets from the effects of global liquidity. Indeed, when
measures such as caps to LTV and DSTI and housing-related capital requirements are tight, house
price responses are mostly insignificant, whereas the responses for loose policies are positive and
significant. The mean differences are also positive and significant for both caps to LTV and DSTI
and capital requirements. Among the most used measures, housing taxation does not appear to
reduce the impact of global liquidity shocks as tight measures are significant at longer horizons and
mean differences are not statistically significant. This also applies to relatively less used instruments
such as limits to banks’ exposure to housing and provisions for housing loans for the responses for
loose and tight limits and housing provisions for housing loans are not significantly different from
each other.
Turning to emerging markets in Panel b, the widely used borrower-oriented measures (caps to
LTV and taxation on housing) reduce the impact of global shocks on local house prices. Although
house price responses are significant for both loose and tight policy stances, the mean differences
are positive and significant, especially for housing taxation. Measures oriented towards housing
credit supply do not appear to shield countries successfully from global liquidity shocks for the
responses for loose and tight measures are not significantly different.
These findings are consistent with the conclusions of the literature that housing-related measures
generally reduce house prices and bank credit growth (Lim et al., 2011; Kuttner and Shim, 2016;
Zhang and Zoli, 2016; Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018; Bruno et al., 2017). To note that while
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the literature finds that caps to LTV are unable to affect house prices directly (Zhang and Zoli, 2016;
Cerutti et al., 2017b; Craig and Hua, 2011; Igan and Kang, 2011; Cerutti et al., 2017a; Kuttner
and Shim, 2016; Vandenbussche et al., 2015), we show that this measure is effective in reducing
countries’ exposure to global liquidity shocks. Another measure extensively used, housing taxation,
successfully reduce the effects of global shocks in emerging markets, in line with Kuttner and Shim
(2016) who document that tightening of housing taxation significantly reduces house prices. In
conclusion, we find general support for the effectiveness of measures targeting both borrowers and
lenders in mitigating the exposure of housing markets to global liquidity shocks.
Foreign currency measures (Figure 10): Whilst not used in advanced economies, emerging mar-
kets rely on foreign-currency measures. In Panel b, we show that house price responses in emerging
markets are stronger when foreign currency reserve requirements and limits to foreign currency
bank loans are loose, especially in the short run. Consistently, the literature has documented that
these instruments significantly reduce bank flows to emerging markets (Ostry et al., 2012; Bruno
et al., 2017), and their benefits extend beyond countries to the region (Beirne and Friedrich, 2014).
Foreign currency measures are thus effective in mitigating the effects of foreign credit on local
housing markets (see Figure 2).
Capital controls on foreign investors (Figure 10): The IRFs in Panel a show that house prices
in advanced economies are affected by global liquidity shocks irrespective of the capital account
policy. Conversely, in Panel b we can see that house prices in emerging markets are positively
and significantly affected by global liquidity shocks only when general and real estate specific
capital controls are looser. Indeed, the responses are insignificant in the middle row, when both
capital controls are tight. The differences between the mean IRFs is positive and significant for
the real estate specific capital controls, whereas it is negative for general capital controls. Thus,
we document that capital controls targeted specifically at foreign investments in real estate prove
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effective in mitigating the impact of changes in global financing conditions on the local housing
market in emerging markets. In particular, adopting restrictions on foreign investments in real
estate measures significantly restrict the entrance of foreign investors, which is one of the channels
through which global financing conditions affect the housing markets (Figure 2).
In conclusion, we document that the adoption of macroprudential policy can reduce the exposure
of countries to global liquidity shocks. In particular, we find that housing policy tools are more
effective in advanced economies than emerging markets. Conversely, banking policy measures are
more effective in emerging markets. This is in line with the evidence that countries adopt policies
for different reasons. Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) suggest that advanced economies use
housing-related macroprudential policy to tackle house price dynamics, whereas emerging markets
rely on general macroprudential policy for credit growth. Interestingly, we document that widely
used measures such as caps to LTV are effective to reduce the impact of global liquidity shocks in
both advanced and emerging markets.
7 Conclusion
The paper investigates the impact of global liquidity on house prices around the world and the
effectiveness of government policies to tackle this exposure. We introduce a new measure of global
liquidity, which focuses on the private component of liquidity on the major wholesale funding
markets for financial intermediaries, that is the repurchase agreement (repo) market not only in
the US, but also in the UK and Europe. Changes in the availability of financing in the main financial
systems may affect house prices via the funding channel that transmits global conditions into the
local banking sector through bank flows. In line with previous findings we document that global
liquidity triggers house price movements around the world (Darius and Radde, 2010; Tillmann,
2013; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015). However, our analysis adds insights to this linkage. Indeed, we
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find that the effect does not only originate from the US, but also from the other systematically
important financial systems.
After establishing the exposure of countries to global shocks, we turn to the analysis of the
effectiveness of macroprudential and monetary policy. Indeed, we ask whether these tools may
reduce countries exposure to global shocks. While a nascent literature has investigated the effect of
macroprudential policy on house prices and credit growth, this is to the best of our knowledge the
first study to look at its ability to shield countries from global shocks. Interestingly, we document
a strikingly different effectiveness of these policies in advanced and emerging markets. While
both advanced and emerging markets can employ monetary policy to mitigate the exposure of
their housing markets to global shocks, macroprudential policy tools have different effectiveness.
Advanced economies can rely on macroprudential instruments, especially housing-related and a few
banking measures, to shield their housing markets from global shocks. On the other hand, we find
banking macroprudential instruments in emerging markets to be effective in reducing the exposure
but not in shielding countries from global liquidity shocks. We show that only specific housing
tools that target borrowers can reduce the impact of global shocks on house prices, namely caps
to LTV and housing taxes. Importantly, emerging markets can adopt not only foreign currency
macroprudential policy measures, such as reserve requirements on foreign currency accounts and
limits to foreign currency loans, but also focused restrictions to non-resident investments in the
local real estate sector, which have been found to be effective in limiting the liquidity impact on
house prices.
Our analysis has shown that governments have a number of policy instruments at their disposal
to mitigate of global liquidity on their real estate sector.
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Appendix
Table 1A: Description of the variables included in the analysis
Variables Data source
Global liquidity proxies
Amount outstanding of repos in the US Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Amount outstanding of repos in the UK Bank of England
Amount outstanding of repos in EU European Central Bank
US broker dealer leverage Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
VIX CBOE
TED spread for US, UK, and EU FRED database, Bank of England
and Datastream
House prices
Brazil (from 1Q2001), Canada, Chile (from 1Q2002),
Colombia, Czech Republic (from 1Q2008), Estonia
(from 3Q2003), Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia (from
1Q2002), Israel, Korea, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico
(from 1Q2005), New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philip-
pines (from 1Q2008), Poland (from 3Q2006), Russia
(from 1Q2001), Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Thailand
BIS dataset of residential house
prices
Australia, Croatia, Denmark FRED residential price indexes
Argentina (from 4Q2006) Buenos Aires Statistics and Census
Bulgaria (from 2001) EUROSTAT
China (from 2000) National Bureau of Statistics of
China
Hungary Central Bank
India (from 2001) National Housing Bank
Japan, Slovak Republic (from 1Q2005) OECD
Latvia (from 2000), Slovenia (from 2003) ECB
Taiwan (from 1Q2001) Sinyi
Uruguay National Institute of Statistics
Other variables
Bank flows measured by external claims (deposits and
loans) of reporting banks vis-a`-vis banks of each coun-
try
BIS Locational statistics
Domestic short-term interest rates IMF IFS and OECD
Real GDP growth rates (for each country and the
world)
IMF WEO
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Table 2A: Description of the macroprudential policy indicators and capital controls
Variables Description Data source
Macroprudential policy
Local currency reserve
requirements, For-
eign currency reserve
requirements
Indicator of intensity of change in the policy with numerical positive and
negative integers assigned each quarter. Available for all countries from
2000 to 2014.
Cerutti et al.
(2017b)
Capital buffer, Capi-
tal buffer for housing
loans*
Indicator of 1 for implementation and 0 for no change in the quarter.
There is no -1 for undo of the implementation of the Basel accord.
Available for all countries from 2000 to 2014, except capital buffer for
Uruguay.
Cerutti et al.
(2017b)
Limits to interbank ex-
posure, Limits to bank
concentration, Caps to
LTV*
Indicators of 1 for tightening, -1 for loosening, and 0 for no change in the
quarter. Available for all countries from 2000 to 2014, except interbank
exposure for Brazil, China, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Serbia, South Africa, Taiwan,
and Uruguay; and except bank concentration for Denmark, Hungary,
Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, Taiwan, Thai-
land, and Uruguay.
Cerutti et al.
(2017b)
Leverage ratio, Taxa-
tion on activities, Lim-
its to foreign currency
loans
Indicator of 1 when the policy is in place, and 0 otherwise. We build
indicator of changes to the policy by taking the first difference. Available
for all countries except Denmark, Taiwan and Uruguay from 2000 to
2013.
Cerutti et al.
(2017a)
Caps to DSTI*, Hous-
ing related taxes*, Lim-
its to banks’ exposure
to housing*, Loan loss
provision for housing
loans*
Indicator of the number of policy actions taken in a month. We sum the
indicator for the months in each quarter to obtain the quarterly series.
Available for all countries from 2000 to 2012.
Kuttner and Shim
(2016)
Banking policy index,
Housing policy index*
Aggregated index. We make the series comparable and turn each mea-
sure into indicators of 1 for tightening, -1 for loosening and 0 for no
changes in the policy in the quarter. We then sum all related series.
Own calculations
Capital controls
Capital controls on real
estate purchase and sale
by nonresidents
Indicator of 1 when controls are in place, and 0 otherwise. Available for
all countries except Croatia, Serbia and Taiwan from 2000 to 2013.
Ferna´ndez et al.
(2015)
General capital controls Index normalized to take values between 0 and 1 and it is the first
principal component of proxies for regulatory controls of both current
and capital account transactions, for the existence of multiple exchange
rates, and for requirements on export proceeds. Available for all coun-
tries except Serbia and Taiwan until 2013.
Ito and Chinn
(2006)
Notes: * indicates housing specific macroprudential policy measures.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel a. Repo amount outstanding
US UK EU
Levels ($mil)
mean 1,904,527 123,430 672,660
median 1,866,380 120,073 581,437
st dev 446,552 34,437 187,779
max 2,687,617 224,015 1,095,294
min 1,199,624 63,175 440,076
Changes (%)
mean 1.2 1.4 1.1
median 1.5 3.6 1.0
st dev 4.3 11.6 5.2
max 12.6 30.3 11.1
min -16.7 -41.2 -11.6
Panel b. Changes in house prices (%)
Advanced economies Emerging markets
mean 0.8 0.5
median 0.7 0.6
st dev 2.1 3.4
max 6.2 8.9
min -5.2 -9.7
Notes: Descriptive statistics are reported for the funding liquidity measures for each financial
system in Panel a. These systems are US, UK, and EU. Panel b reports the descriptive statistics of
quarterly changes in house prices for the countries in our sample. Statistics are first calculated for
each country and then averaged within subsamples. The advanced subsample comprises Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The emerging subsample includes Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. Changes refer to the average quarterly change over the
sample period. The sample starts in January 2000 to December 2014.
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Table 2: Macroprudential policy actions
Total Advanced Emerging
economies markets
Banking policy 338 52 286
LC reserve req. 223 8 215
Capital req. 67 27 40
Bank concentr. 23 6 17
Interbank exp. 15 8 7
Leverage ratios 4 2 2
Taxes 6 1 5
Foreign currency (FC) measures 114 8 106
FC reserve req. 108 6 102
Limits FC loans 6 2 4
Housing policy 255 115 140
LTV cap 83 48 35
DSTI cap 32 17 15
Housing tax 61 28 33
Housing cap req. 45 15 30
Limits housing exp. 10 2 8
Housing LLP 24 5 19
Notes: Number of policy actions per quarter taken by each country aggregated at country group.
For comparability, the series of the number of policy actions were turned into indicators of 1 for
tightening, -1 for loosening and zero for no changes in the policy in the quarter. Specifically, these
series are domestic and foreign reserve requirements, caps to DSTI, housing taxation, housing LLP,
and housing limits bank exposure. The number of policy action is calculated as the sum of the
absolute values of the indicators, aggregated within subsamples. The advanced subsample comprises
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway,
Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The emerging subsample includes Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. The sample is from January 2000 to December
2014.
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Table 3: Forecast error variance decomposition
Advanced economies Emerging markets
quarters Liquidity shock Rate shock Liquidity shock Rate shock
1 8.36 2.18 4.69 5.78
4 11.73 10.17 11.84 10.11
8 13.58 13.69 16.74 14.75
12 15.09 14.33 19.27 16.09
16 16.36 14.53 20.26 16.58
20 17.19 14.72 20.72 16.69
Notes: The table reports the forecast error variance decomposition of house prices of to shocks in
funding liquidity and short-term interest rates. All VARs include funding liquidity, world output,
bank flows, real GDP growth, short-term interest rates, and house prices. Funding liquidity is
measured by aggregate repos. All variables except bank flows, short-term rates and GDP are in
logs. The advanced subsample comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel,
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The emerging
subsample includes Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. The sample is
from January 2000 to December 2014.
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Table 4: Do macroprudential policy measures reduce the exposure of house prices to global liquidity
shocks?
Advanced economies Emerging markets
Banking policy
LC reserve req. not effective not conclusive
Capital req. effective effective
Bank concentr. not effective effective
Interbank exp. not effective effective
Leverage ratios effective NA
Taxes NA effective
Housing policy
LTV cap effective effective
DSTI cap effective not effective
Housing tax not effective effective
Housing cap req. effective not effective
Limits housing exp. not effective not effective
Housing LLP not effective not effective
Foreign currency (FC) measures
FC reserve req. NA effective
Limits FC loans NA effective
Capital account controls
KA control not effective effective
Real estate cap. controls not effective effective
Notes: The table reports the effectiveness of macroprudential and capital control policies to reduce
the impact of global liquidity shocks on house prices. In particular, policies are indicated with
effective when the impact of global liquidity shocks on house prices is reduced by the implementation
of tight policy, as opposed to loose policy, and not effective when the impact with tight and loose
policy is not significantly different as indicated by the mean differences of the responses. not
conclusive indicates policies for which effectiveness could not be determined. NA indicates policies
that are not widely used and for which effectiveness could not be determined.
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Figure 1: House prices, bank flows, global liquidity, and policy. The figure reports the
quarterly series of house prices (plot a), cross-border bank flows (plot b, left axis - black line) and
funding liquidity (plot b, right axis - blue line), and the macroprudential policy index for banking
and housing related measures (plot c, left axis - black solid and dotted lines, respectively) , and
monetary policy (plot c, right axis - blue line). House prices are averaged within countries in
the subsamples and are indexed to 100 in 2010. Bank flows are external claims of BIS reporting
banks vis-a`-vis the banking sector aggregated across countries and measured in billions of US$.
Funding liquidity is the aggregated average monthly amount outstanding of repos in US, UK and
EU and measured in trillion of US$. The macroprudential policy indexes are cumulated, aggregated
banking and housing related measures averaged across countries in the subsamples. The monetary
policy is the short term interest rate averaged across countries in the subsamples. The advanced
subsample comprises Australia, Canada, Denmark, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, New
Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The emerging subsample includes
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.
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Figure 2: Global liquidity and house prices - transmission channels and macroprudential
policy. The figure shows the scheme of the transmission channels of the impact of global liquidity
on house prices and the role of different types of policy. “Bank MPP” indicates banking-specific
macroprudential policy measures, “Housing MPP” indicates the housing-specific macroprudential
policy measures,“FC MPP” indicates macroprudential policy measures that target foreign currency
lending, “Real estate capital controls” indicates controls on real estate investments by foreigners,
and finally REITs stands for real estate investment trusts.
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Figure 3: Global liquidity. The figure shows the evolution of global liquidity employing a se-
ries of measures that capture directly or indirectly funding conditions across borders. Repos is
funding availability in global financial markets measured by the amount outstanding of repurchase
agreements in the US, EU, and UK in trillions US$ (plotted on the left axis - solid line), TED
spreads are funding cost in the US measured by the difference between the 3-month US LIBOR
and Treasury yields in % (plotted on the left axis - dashed line), Leverage ratio is the leverage
ratio of US broker dealers (plotted on the right axis - dotted line), and the V IX is risk aversion in
global markets measured by the implied volatility in S&P500 options (plotted on the right axis -
dash-dot line).
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Figure 4: Global liquidity shocks: Impact on house prices and bank flows. The solid
black lines are IRFs of house prices and bank flows to a one-time shock of one standard deviation
in funding liquidity. The IRFs are averaged across countries in advanced economies in Panel a,
and in emerging markets in Panel b. The dotted lines are two standard error confidence bands.
The VAR models comprise global liquidity, world output, bank flows, real GDP growth, short term
interest rates, and house prices, are estimated with 1 or 2 lags and a time trend.
Panel a. Advanced economies
Panel b. Emerging markets
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Figure 5: Alternative sources of global liquidity shocks: impact on house prices. The
solid black lines are IRFs of house prices to a one-time shock of one standard deviation in funding
liquidity. The dotted lines are two standard error confidence bands. The VAR models comprise
global liquidity, world output, bank flows, real GDP growth, short term interest rates, and house
prices, are estimated with 1 or 2 lags and a time trend.
Panel a. Advanced economies
Panel b. Emerging markets
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Figure 6: Global liquidity shocks in the pre-crisis period. The solid black lines are IRFs of
house prices to a one-time shock of one standard deviation in funding liquidity. The dotted lines
are two standard error confidence bands. The VAR models comprise global liquidity, world output,
bank flows, real GDP growth, short term interest rates, and house prices, are estimated with 1 or
2 lags.
Panel a. Advanced economies
Panel b. Emerging markets
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Figure 7: Domestic monetary policy shocks. The solid black lines are IRFs of house prices to
a one-time shock of one standard deviation in short-term interest rates, averaged across countries
in each country group. Country groups are reported in the title, with AEs for advanced economies
and EMs for emerging markets. The dotted lines are two standard error confidence bands. The
VAR models comprise global liquidity as aggregate repos, world output, bank flows, real GDP
growth, short term interest rates, and house prices, are estimated with 1 or 2 lags and a time trend.
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Figure 8: Policy effect on the impact of global liquidity shocks on house prices (in %):
Macroprudential banking policy. The solid line represents the IRFs of house prices (in %) to a one
time shock of one standard deviation in global liquidity. In the top row, the responses are averaged across
the bottom 25% of each policy indicator (loose macroprudential policy), in the middle row the responses are
averaged across the top 75% of each policy indicator (tight macroprudential policy), and in the bottom row
the mean differences (loose minus tight) are reported. The dotted lines are two standard error confidence
bands. All VAR models have funding liquidity interacted with the macroprudential policy indicator, together
with world output, bank flows, real GDP growth, short-term interest rates, and house prices. Policy measures
are noted in the titles of the plots and include: local currency reserve requirements (LC reserve req.), capital
requirements (Capital req.), limits to bank concentration (Bank concentr.), limits to interbank exposure
(Interbank exp.), the fixed minimum leverage ratio (Leverage ratios) and taxes on banks (Taxes).
Panel a. Advanced economies
Panel b. Emerging markets
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Figure 9: Policy effect on the impact of global liquidity shocks on house prices (in %):
Macroprudential housing policy. The solid line represents the IRFs of house prices (in %) to a one
time shock of one standard deviation in global liquidity. In the top row the responses are averaged across
the bottom 25% of each policy indicator (loose macroprudential policy), in the middle row the responses are
averaged across the top 75% of each policy indicator (tight macroprudential policy), and in the bottom row
the mean differences (loose minus tight) are reported. The dotted lines are two standard error confidence
bands. All VAR models have funding liquidity interacted with the macroprudential policy indicator, together
with world output, bank flows, real GDP growth, short-term interest rates, and house prices. Policy measures
are noted in the titles of the plots and include: caps to LTV (LTV cap), caps to DSTI (DSTI cap), housing
related taxation (Housing tax ), capital requirements for housing loans (Housing cap req.), limits to banks’
exposure to housing (Limits housing exp.), and provisions on housing loans (Housing LLP).
Panel a. Advanced economies
Panel b. Emerging markets
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Figure 10: Policy effect on the impact of global liquidity shocks on house prices (in
%): Macroprudential foreign currency policy & capital controls. The solid line represents
the IRFs of house prices (in %) to a one time shock of one standard deviation in global liquidity. In the
top row the responses are averaged across the bottom 25% of each policy indicator (loose macroprudential
policy), in the middle row the responses are averaged across the top 75% of each policy indicator (tight
macroprudential policy), and in the bottom row the mean differences (loose minus tight) are reported. The
dotted lines are two standard error confidence bands. All VAR models have funding liquidity interacted with
the macroprudential policy indicator for each policy measure, together with world output, bank flows, real
GDP growth, short-term interest rates, and house prices. Policy measures are noted in the titles of the plots
and include: reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits (FC reserve req.), limits to foreign currency
loans (FC loan limits), capital account controls (KA controls), and controls on real estate investments by
foreigners (Real estate cap. controls).
Panel a. Advanced economies
Panel b. Emerging markets
51
